

03 AUG 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Logistics

SUBJECT: Additional Energy Saving Measures

1. There is substantial evidence around CIA facilities of our compliance with both the spirit and letter of the President's recent directive to implement specific energy saving measures. I understand that you are interested in ideas for further savings in this area. The following suggestions are offered for your consideration. The ideas are presented and aimed at saving energy; they may or may not also save money.

2. The suggestions are:

a. Instant Start Video Screens--

Many television sets, computer terminal CRT's, and word processor viewing screens are equipped with instant start features. This requires a continuous electric current drain even when the unit is turned-off. Therefore, these sets are continuing to consume power after duty hours, on weekends, etc. These pieces of equipment should be modified to terminate all power consumption when not in use. This may be as simple as requiring operators to disconnect plugs, or modifying switches. Some word processors may have memory units that require constant power, and restart could require reloading of software programs. Microwave ovens in food vending may have the same fast-start feature.

b. Pneumatic Tube System--

Consider closing this system and hiring part-time employees, (handicapped?) as internal couriers. This is probably a large power consumer.

c. Electric Typewriters--

Many papers such as routing slips, draft papers, informal notes, could be handwritten or typed on manual typewriters.

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Electric typing could be reserved for final versions of formal correspondence. This saves direct power use and heat load on the building environment system.

d. Electric Desk Calculators, etc.--

Electric and electro-mechanical desk calculators could be replaced with low-power pocket or desk-type electronic models. Such items as electric pencil sharpeners, electric erasers, etc., should be eliminated. Also, reduce the number of electric clocks in offices.

e. Others--

Revert to mechanical systems where electrically powered items are now used such as: floor polishers, carpet sweepers, badge-check machine turnstiles.


Chief, Science & Technology Group
Office of the Comptroller

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
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AGENDA

Agency Energy Committee
3 October 1979, 1530 Hours
DDA Conference Room, 7D32 Headquarters

° Power and Environment Considerations

- Use of Fans and Heaters
- Uninterrupted Power System (UPS)
- Small Boiler, Power Plant
- Assignment of Engineer

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° Employee Awareness

- Pamphlets
- Vanpools
- Parking Policy

P&PS



C/LSD

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"/LSD


° Policy Implications

- Courier System
- Use of Government Vehicles
- Flexitime, Compressed Workweek

"

C/LSD

P&PS



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Employee Suggestions

P&PS

- Turn off Hot Water Taps, except one
- Installation of Vacuum Gauge on Government Vehicles
- Disconnect Air Conditioners on Government Vehicles
- Discontinue same Shuttle Services and Utilize Public Transportation
- Shuttle Service from Pentagon

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Executive Summary

1. As instructed by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), Recommendation 21 of the Security Review Task Force has been reviewed—from an operational and resource implication point-of-view—by an Agencywide working group. Recommendation 21 states:

"It is recommended that all office copiers and microform printers be located in registries or document control centers, to be operated only by information control specialists who will ensure that all copies of controlled documents are properly registered, controlled, and stored." ☐

2. There are currently 255 office copiers and over 300 microform printers and duplicators in use in CIA in the Metropolitan Washington, D.C. Area. ☐

3. In an attempt to assess the operational and resource implications of Recommendation 21, the working group developed questionnaires for completion by office level (DDO division) functional and records management personnel throughout the CIA. To our knowledge this is the first time that such data collection has been attempted. While our analysis and conclusions are based in largest part on the data collected, the reader must understand that the time available for this study was inadequate for precise data collection and analysis and, as a result, for conclusive findings. ☐

4. At the Agency level, our findings suggest that at least 575 additional work-years will be required to implement Recommendation 21 (i.e., to control all accountable documents ^{1/} reproduced on office copiers and microform printers). While this represents a considerable resource investment—the largest that can be measured in even approximate terms—there are clearly other, and perhaps more significant, implications. The CIA's ability to produce and disseminate timely and optimal national intelligence—and all that is required to facilitate this process—will be

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For purposes of this study, accountable documents are defined by the Office of Security to be: collateral TOP SECRET, all Special Compartmented Information, Bigot, and D.O.E. Restricted Data documents extant in hardcopy or microform.

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re: items

dissemination

severely diminished. A sentiment expressed by many during the course of our study perhaps best captures one of the dilemmas posed by Recommendation 21:

We can produce 2/ timely and responsive finished intelligence and we can control all sensitive intelligence documents in full accordance with existing regulations, directives, and Executive Orders, so long as we are not asked to do both at the same time. ☐

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5. There is another conflicting dilemma posed by Recommendation 21. The DDO and DDS&T information security practices are essentially aimed at limiting accountable document information to only those people with a strict need for such information. NFAC, on the other hand, by and large facilitates a broad dissemination of its product—both internally and externally, by virtue of its functional role in the intelligence process. The DDA information security practice is in largest part a reflection of the customers it is serving, as best exemplified by the Cable Secretariat and Printing and Photography activities. On the surface of the Recommendation 21 issue, a one-Agency policy would appear counterproductive if different from current practices. ☐

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6. Additional problems would be created by full implementation of Recommendation 21. Chief amongst them would be:

- the increased potential for unauthorized disclosure of sensitive intelligence information, given the large number and probable high turnover of junior "information control officers";
- diminished employee productivity, in the face of even further Agency personnel reductions;
- the extensive reallocation of and renovation to existing CIA office space, already at a premium; and
- the potential utility of the SAFE and ADSTAR automated information handling/management systems under current development, as well as many current ODP-supplied remote computer terminals and printers. ☐

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7. In our study of Recommendation 21, we did not take into account the impact of any of the other information control recommendations of the

2/ read . . . produce, collect, or support, to greater or lesser degrees, depending upon which CIA functional element you are addressing.

Security Review Task Force. Clearly the implementation of several of these or alternative recommendations, primarily recommendations 14, 17, 22, and 26 could seriously impact on office copier/microform printer findings or decisions. It is our judgment that many of these information control recommendations will have to be examined collectively before effective decisions can be reached and implemented.

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8. The recommendations of this working group are:

- a) that the DDCI not implement Recommendation 21 as proposed;
- b) that the DDCI establish an Agencywide working group to more fully assess the operational and resource implications of implementing Recommendation 21 of the Security Review Task Force (A proposed memorandum to implement this Recommendation is attached at Attachment A.);
- c) that several positive steps can be taken immediately by the DDCI to improve the control of accountable documents reproduced on office copiers and microform printers:
 - (1) task the Office of Security with developing and implementing a continuing Agencywide employee security awareness program that includes the safeguarding of information contained in accountable documents;
 - (2) task the Deputy Director for Science and Technology and the Director of Security with assessing for the DDCI the current state of technology that could be brought to bear on the problem of detecting documents reproduced on office copiers and microform printers/duplicators when an attempt is made to remove them from CIA facilities and with developing an estimate of the feasibility, cost, and time required to implement such a capability; and
 - 3) direct that all copying devices be locked or otherwise secured after working hours, thereby reducing unauthorized copying during non-duty hours. Appropriate recognition must be made, however, for the emergency needs of shift-work activities.

9. The regulations and directives that establish accountable document controls—primarily in the Sensitive Compartmented Information area—and the personnel resources available to satisfy these requirements are grossly incompatible. The Security Task Force properly points to the fact that

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"... (records management control) systems have developed which were adequate in their time 3/, but which did not envision the massive amount of material being produced by the subsequently-developed technologies for collection and dissemination . . ." 4/ As intelligence information availability has grown geometrically over the years, the corresponding need for records management personnel has not been satisfied. The need for at least 575 additional work-years is the cumulative result of our failure to provide these personnel resources to CIA components as the need has arisen—gradually over the past 15 years or so. Even with the provision of unlimited records management resources, however, the price that must be paid—at least in NFAC—will be the adverse impact on the production of timely intelligence. ☐

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10. One final conclusion is, we feel, pertinent to the discussion of Recommendation 21. The full implementation of this Recommendation, at whatever cost, will not guarantee the security of documents containing sensitive intelligence information. In the final analysis, CIA must rely on the integrity of its people. CIA employee selection and pre-employment screening practices are second to none in Government, industry, or academia. While we have experienced security failures (i.e., the unauthorized disclosure of classified information) in the past, we must continue to carefully balance the effect of additional security protection measures against the benefits that we expect to result. ☐

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3/ "Adequate control", in the analyst environment, has never been individual document accountability. Rather, physical security constraints—the barriers—were used. Documents have always been freely available to analysts within their work environs.

4/ "A Security Review of the Central Intelligence Agency", page 55.